The Third Way

The success of PTI in the general elections represents a significant shift in Pakistani politics. A third power has arrived to counteract the influence of PPP and PML-N.

For a shift to occur, it isn't enough that a party simply carves out room for itself on the political scene. It must do so on the basis of some new political idea or strategy that hasn't been tried before.

In the case of PTI, it can claim to be the first truly democratic party in Pakistan on the basis of the highly visible and transparent internal elections that it conducted leading up to the general elections. When these internal elections were conducted, many onlookers believed that PTI would have been better off delaying them given the destabilizing nature of party elections. However, PTI proved that internal elections could take place and party unity could still be maintained. That PTI was able to reorganize themselves after the internal elections and launch an effective election campaign displays a level of party professionalism rarely seen in Pakistan's political culture.

Another characteristic that sets PTI apart is consistency regarding policy. For example, it has steadily maintained a clear anti-drone stance. For better or for worse, it has refused to compromise on this issue. This is in stark contrast to the policy adopted by the previous PPP government which tacitly allowed drone attacks while publicly condemning them.

However, there are several grounds on which people argue against PTI being a third force.

There is the fact that PTI has only been able to form a government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Even if the party manages to set itself apart from other parties, it only has representation in KP. The argument is that this isn't enough representation to cause any major political shift.

However, parliamentary presence is not the only indicator of popularity. For example, PML-N has more than three times the number of National Assembly seats as PTI. However, it has only won twice as many votes overall. These results don't even take into account the vote-rigging that occurred in Punjab where PML-N won the brunt of its National Assembly seats. The same can be said for the vote-rigging that occurred in Karachi. Eyewitnesses and vote counts testify to PTI's substantial popularity here despite the near omniscient presence of MQM.

It is clear, then, that the alternative appeal of PTI is not relegated to KP.

Another complaint that is frequently brought forward is that PTI came to power using political tactics not much different from other parties.

For example, PTI brought political veterans like Shah Mehmood Qureshi and Javed Hashmi into its ranks. As Makhdooms, they derive much - if not all - of their political capital from their personalities and not their policy positions. By engaging in this practice, is PTI not perpetuating personality-based politics in Pakistan?

There is no doubt that these are expedient measures which PTI used to gain a short-term advantage. However, as a party which has national ambitions, PTI needs to work within the very political culture that it seeks to change. And this political culture is a direct product of a social culture which is frequently centered on powerful individuals, clans and families. It is that culture which produces the phenomenon of personality-based politics.

Many critics also point out that the party engaged in the age-old practice of seat adjustment with the likes of Jamaat Islaami and Sheikh Rasheed. This tactic is essentially an alliance of convenience which parties enter into to secure seats. It is rarely an alliance based on vision. The worst part is that it degrades the political process by removing the element of competition between parties.

This, however, is once again a by-product of Pakistani society. Many voters simply refuse to vote along the lines of ideology. And where there is no demand for a competition of ideas, there will be no supply of ideas. It is within this context that PTI - like all other parties - agreed to enter into seat adjustments. The difference is that with PTI, there is at least some room for ideology. With most other parties, there is little to none.

In any case, this is all set against the backdrop of elections in which many parties came to power through coercion, voter intimidation, and rigging. Gaining power through personality-based politics and seat adjustments may be short-sighted. But it doesn't compare to stealing a mandate.

PTI must use the mandate that it has gained to solidify its position and push through its policies wherever it has gained power. KP represents a major challenge in terms of security and success here will have far-reaching consequences for the rest of the country as well. KP, then, will be one of the major tests of whether PTI represents a true third way.

Reform, Revolution and Conservatism

Is reform possible?

Though it may not seem so, the upcoming elections offer a significant opportunity for change in Pakistan's political system.

On one side stand the tried and tested crop of parties. Those that have tasted power and would like nothing more than to do so again. Their constituents may differ and their strategies may diverge. But they all share the distinction of having been major forces at some level of the past government. The PPP has ruled in the centre and has kept its hold on Sindh. The PML-N has dominated Punjab. And MQM has governed Karachi with an iron fist.

On what basis do such parties campaign for votes? After all, Pakistan has lurched from one crisis to another on their watch. Whether it be an economic crisis in the form of inflation or a fiscal crisis brought on by aid dependency, the country is experiencing crises on virtually all counts.

For parties like the PPP whose constituents are largely the rural poor, election campaigning isn't much to worry about. Most of their constituents have neither the time nor the resources to understand the crises that are afflicting them and who to assign blame to. However, other parties have to deal with constituents who have the capability of understanding the quagmire that the ruling parties have thrown them in.

Faced with no track record to offer, such parties instead promise stability in a world of political uncertainty.

The constant presence of the Sharif brothers, Altaf Hussain and the Chaudhary brothers are all an attempt to remind people that change is not always a good thing and that experience in government should count for something. In short, people should vote for them because their parties have lasted and ruled the longest.

Such reasoning ignores the fact that power brings with it many benefits. One of these is the ability to manufacture legitimacy for your party. The rampant politicization within Pakistan's law enforcement agencies and judicial system means that any party in power can use the legal and judicial system to survive no matter what the wishes of the public may be. The longevity of these parties, then, may not be a reflection of the public services they provide but rather of how well they can use the system for their own sustenance.

The appeal for no change is also a clear violation of this generation's democratic right to reshape their country as they see fit. This violation is particularly acute in the case of youth that are willing to vote for someone different in the face of biradari, ethnic and family peer pressure. No generation should have to inherit the political evils of a past generation for the sake of stability. This is especially true when the previous political administration has little good to offer and much ill.

If this conservative appeal for stability and lack of change is not the requirement of the day, then what form of change is ideal? And how should it be brought about? Through reform? Or revolution?

Reform begins with a recognition that whatever needs to be reformed is capable of being saved and doesn't need total dismantling. This is ideal for Pakistan where social structures are ancient and capable of enduring whatever revolution is thrown their way. Social structures such as biradaris and pirs don't lend themselves well to a modern form of ideological politics. The only solution, then, is to layer ideology on top of such structures.

Of all the current parties, PTI is the only one that has attempted to achieve something like this. When it began bringing on board political veterans like Shah Mehmood Qureshi and Javed Hashmi, the party leadership was severely criticized for abandoning its ideology in the name of political expediency. However, it vindicated itself by holding transparent internal elections and legitimizing positions at all levels of the party. In this way, PTI reformed traditional politics by blending it with visionary politics.

Besides a willingness to work with what already exists, another advantage of incremental reform is its ability to take place without violence and coercion. In contrast to the brand of bombastic and radical politics that a figure like Tahir-Ul-Qadri advocates, incremental reform attempts to bring about change in a manner acceptable even to enemies of reform. This is because incremental reform works around political divisions through consensus-building and not violence.

When Tahir-Ul-Qadri took to the streets to demand electoral reforms, the PTI leadership was under populist pressure to join in. However, its refusal to do so was vindicated when Qadri began making anti-democratic statements and hinted at forcing the government's hand violently. This points to PTI's commitment to incremental and long-standing reform.

Change is inevitable. Hopefully, for the better. And the only mechanism that can provide this is incremental reform.

Caught between conservatism and revolutionary ideologues, PTI will stand alone on election day as the only party that has genuinely pushed for true reform.

Alliances of Convenience

In the run-up to the general elections, electoral alliances are occurring at a staggering rate.

They're taking place between the ruling PPP and its largest coalition partner, the PML (Q). The PML (N) has joined hands with a host of smaller opposition parties. Even parties with no representation in parliament - such as PTI - have joined in

Electoral alliances don't necessarily remain once elections are over. Nothing prevents a party from backing out of a ruling coalition. After the 2008 elections, the PML (N) did just that when it backed out of the government. However, it never gave up parliament. Instead, it managed to remain in opposition and continue to have its voice heard - albeit, in a less direct way. The main purpose of its electoral alliance, then, was not to form a government with the PPP and implement any sort of joint government policy. Rather, it was to grab as many parliamentary seats as possible.

It is with this view that one should analyze Pakistan's ongoing electoral alliances. They're not examples of parties wishing to implement joint policies. What use for joint policies when politics is based on individuals and not policies? Nor are such alliances examples of ideological consensus. What use for ideological consensus where there is no ideology?

In Pakistan's current political culture, electoral alliances are simply a convenient means of grabbing seats in parliament.

Is this such a bad thing? After all, a party should strive to ensure that the voices of those that it claims to represent are heard. And the parliament is one avenue for this.

The problem is that Pakistan's current batch of parliamentarians do not garner votes on the basis of any clear principles or ideology. In such a system, the only possible electoral alliance is one that is narrow and short-term.

Pakistani politics lends itself well to alliances and consensus building. There are a range of national issues that can only be solved via legitimate political consensus. One example is the issue of how to share Balouchistan's natural resources. This requires consensus between Balouchi political leadership and the rest of the country. Another example is the issue of the rights to the Indus River. What is required here is an alliance between stakeholders in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Punjab. 

Nor is there a lack of issues requiring electoral consensus at the provincial level. The Sindh People's Local Government Ordinance revealed the tensions that exist between rural and urban Sindh regarding the distribution of administrative power in Sindh. In Punjab, the push for a Seraiki province revealed the difference in living standards between South Punjab and the rest of Punjab and the need for consensus on the distribution of Punjab's provincial resources.

The lack of progress on these issues exposes the refusal of politicians to arrive at any meaningful long-term consensus. Certainly, there are other factors that affect the success or failure of these difficult political issues. The communalism and sectarianism of Pakistani society doesn't help. Nonetheless, it is the job of political leadership to forge a consensus despite such hurdles. This responsibility becomes even more heightened when one considers the rampant illiteracy in Pakistan and the prevalence of uninformed voters. In such an environment, responsibility shifts towards the better informed in society and those with authority and resources.

Instead, the public is confronted with the ruling PPP and the PML (Q) meeting to discuss "seat adjustment". This political tactic amounts to little more than haggling and bargaining over a particular constituency and trading and swapping one constituency for another. This tradition has continued for far too long and political power is far too addictive for political parties to stop engaging in this act on their own.

As such, the responsibility falls on voters to hold their leaders accountable. Such responsibility is made easier by growing media coverage and an increasingly independent judiciary that have allowed the public to become more informed about political events. The voter is now in a better position to judge their political representative.

Ultimately, it is the average person on the street who suffers from alliances of convenience that produce no long-term social gain. When the only consensus that political parties arrive at is which constituencies they can use to gain power, such parties have already shot themselves in the foot. Voters and loyal party followers will inevitably realize the true nature of such alliances when they fail to produce long-term solutions that directly improve their lives.

One Party to Rule Us All

What is an ideal outcome in the upcoming elections?

Everyone has their own definition of ideal. In a society so diverse and a political system so complex, can one expect anything less? Diversity and pluralism breed a range of political interests. What adds to this complexity is that most of these interests stand in direct opposition to each other.

Come election day, some will vote based on ethnicity while others on religion. Some will vote based on loyalty to a political family or to individuals like Pervez Musharraf or Pir Pagara. Some political interests are urban like those that support the MQM while others are rural like the PPP's. Some operate at the national level like PTI's while others are provincial like Punjab's PML-N. The presence of so many political interests represents a splitting of political power within society.

However, one possible election outcome could be the very opposite: a concentration of power in a single party government.

In a way, such an outcome runs counter to the very fabric of Pakistani politics. Over the past 5 years, the ruling PPP has taken the art of building and maintaining a coalition to another level.  This has strengthened the perception that coalition governments are the new Pakistani norm. Such a perception is aided by Pakistan's ethnic diversity which allows the creation of an endless variety of parties around ethnic interests. To make matters worse, there is no shortage of opportunistic politicians who have no ideology but have supporters. The many faces of the PML - N / F / Q - are one of the best examples of this. Such politicians will never allow their voices to be contained by a larger party. Instead, they represent an endless supply of coalition partners that refuse to become a permanent part of the largest party. In this way, they ensure that coalitions thrive and single-party governments remain impossible.

If forming a one-party government is so unnatural in Pakistani politics, why should it be pursued at all? For the simple reason that having a single party controlling the government increases the efficiency, effectiveness and stability of government action. And Pakistan is severely lacking on all three counts. It would mean less time spent on consensus building and more time spent actually implementing policies and laws. The policies need to be well planned and the laws need to be just. But, at the very least, there will be some sense of government attempting to govern.

A legitimate concern is that a one-party government may be unjust against smaller parties. However, elections are always available to vote the party out. Democracy should never be just about consensus-building. It should also be about the government feeling a sense of urgency in delivering upon its mandate and being voted out if it doesn't deliver. Besides elections, there is also the presence of the judiciary to hold the government accountable as well as the media.

What, however, are the chances of a one-party government forming? At least one of two events needs to occur.

Firstly, individuals need to stop identifying themselves and others on the basis of religious sects or ethnicities. This would stop the endless formation of political parties and unite people around a smaller number of parties. However, the chances of this happening in the near future are very remote. Such social change occurs across multiple generations and there is a strong possibility that it may never occur in a country as conservative as Pakistan where people identify themselves less by individual identity and more by the social group they belong to.

The second event that needs to occur is that the largest and most established parties take the initiative and transform themselves from serving a narrow section of the population to representing the concerns of the wider public. It is possible for such unifying parties and leaders to emerge even in a population that is riven by sectarianism. Such a scenario acknowledges the presence of deep divisions within society but seeks to overcome them by promoting a unifying political vision.

It remains to be seen whether such a unifying party can emerge.

The PPP has the advantage of being the largest party in power. It would seem they are the most capable of forming a one-party government. However, their brand of politics has largely consisted of building coalitions to hold onto power. The economic mismanagement that has occurred across Pakistan over the past 5 years as well as the deteriorating security situation has virtually ensured that the PPP won't have the same popular support it commanded following Benazir's death. Far from increasing its share of seats, there is a good chance they will lose power. Besides, the PPP doesn't have any semblance of an ideology that can go beyond Bhutto worship and the rural population of Sindh and Punjab.

The PML-N is the largest party after the PPP and has spent most of the past 5 years in opposition. Ideologically, it is empty and centered around the Sharif family. In terms of a national presence, it doesn't have one and its focus doesn't extend beyond urban Punjab. It has even less of a chance of forming a one-party government.

The only party that stands out in any way is PTI for it has campaigned on the basis of a truly unifying ideology. The ability of this ideology to cut across many segments of society lies in its nationalistic character. PTI's framing of US drone attacks as a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty is one of the best examples of this nationalism. And while it is true that nationalism can be a reactionary force, it is just as true that nationalism can be used to unite people divided by ethnicity. The PTI's brand of nationalism which attempts to use the philosophy of Iqbal is a far cry from the reactionary nationalism of the religious parties.

Regardless of which party forms a one-party government, it is clear that doing so would be a positive step for Pakistan's politics. It would increase the possibility of strong, and capable government. It would mean the presence of a unifying party that can cut across multiple social classes. And it may finally put an end to the ceaseless coalition building that has weakened and paralyzed so many past Pakistani governments.

The Long March back to the Election Commission

Now that Dr. Tahir-Ul-Qadri's long march to Islamabad is over, one can sit back and assess its possible impact on Pakistan's democratic system.

One of the concerns that has been present from the very beginning is Qadri's source of funding for the march. To be more specific, this concern centers on the possible existence of anti-democratic forces behind Qadri. Leaving aside the fact that none of these anti-democratic allegations against Qadri have been proven, one should take care to remember what the aim of the long march was.

 Electoral reform.

This, then, would have to be the first anti-democratic movement in history whose aim was to push for electoral reform and a stronger and more independent Election Commission.

There is also the fact that thousands upon thousands of protestors took part in the march. Whatever the source of Qadri's funding, he managed to tap into a legitimate democratic sentiment of reform in bringing out so many willing people. Is it not undemocratic to doubt the sentiments of such a large number of protestors?

None of this is an attempt to defend anti-democratic forces. The point, rather, is that it is misguided to focus solely on the power behind Qadri. If, at some point in the future, some irregularity is discovered, then Qadri should be held responsible. In the meantime, it is more worthwhile to focus on the fact of the long march itself and its possible future effects.

The primary issue that the protest brought forward was that of electoral reforms. When the march was over, Qadri stressed that the reforms that the government had agreed to implement would strengthen the Election Commission. From a political development perspective, this is a positive. Political systems work best when their institutions remain autonomous and free from interference. A truly independent Election Commission would go some way towards ensuring that Pakistan's elections remain free and fair and truly represent popular will.

It remains to be seen, however, what the exact nature of the electoral reforms will be.

A simple reconfiguring of existing election laws or the introduction of new laws would add little value. Pakistan does not suffer from a lack of laws. It suffers from institutions that are too weak to impartially enforce laws. These institutions simply don't have the manpower, funding, and professionalism that is required to enforce the whole range of laws they are authorized to enforce. Whatever little law enforcement there is, is primarily geared towards the protection of powerful elites at the expense of the vast majority of the population.

On the other hand, if the electoral reforms are aimed not at creating or modifying election laws but at enforcing these laws, then the march will have been worth the effort.

Another issue that was brought forward by the protest was the setup of the caretaker government. Qadri has stated that, as part of the agreement with the government, he will have a say in the appointment of the caretaker prime minister. Handing over such power to Qadri is dangerous because it is possibly unconstitutional. According to the 20th amendment to the Constitution, only members of the government, the opposition, and the Election Commission have the authority to select a caretaker prime-minister. Of course, one can hardly hope for electoral reform when the government and the opposition get to decide the caretaker government. But that is where the Election Commission and Supreme Court come in. They have the political legitimacy to disqualify unqualified candidates. Qadri does not.

In any case, a single caretaker prime minister cannot be expected to bring about the type of systemic change that Pakistan's electoral system requires. 

And so, for all its headline-grabbing ferocity, the Islamabad long march doesn't seem like it will be able to impact Pakistan's democratic system in any appreciable way. The only hope is that the legitimacy and authority of the Election Commission may increase due to the sudden focus on electoral reform.

Sindh Local Government misses the point

At first sight, the Sindh Local Government ordinance seems to be a step in the right direction of effective government administration. However, it is more of a tactical ploy driven by political interests than a strategic plan aimed at delivering quality government administration.

The concept of local governance is one that applies very well to Pakistan's situation. Given the ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences among Pakistanis it is impossible to devise a one-size-fits-all solution to the problem of public administration. The One Unit policy of Ayub Khan and the subsequent secession of East Pakistan is but one example of how excessive centralization can result in disaster. The ongoing discontent in Balochistan is another example.

One possible solution to the problem of local administration is the creation of new provinces. Earlier this year, resolutions that called for the division of Punjab into further provinces were adopted by the National Assembly and the Punjab Provincial Assembly. However, the creation of provinces in a country as ethnically fragmented as Pakistan risks the revival of sectarianism and the mobilization of groups that demand the break-up of Pakistan into provinces based purely on ethnicity.

In contrast, a system of local governance would keep the current provinces intact and still allow for a devolution of powers that can respond to the varying needs of different regions. In addition, it is harder to devise a local government system on the basis of ethnicity than it is to form provinces based on ethnicity.

However, the problem with local government arises when one considers the relationship between the state and political parties as it has historically existed in Pakistan .

Far from viewing state finances as something to be used for public investment, Pakistan's political parties have primarily viewed them as a way of paying off supporters. The methods of payoff range from the creation and awarding of useless ministerial posts to the handing out of state loans that are never paid back. There is a strong possibility that the state money which will flow to the local government will be used as similar political payoff. There is nothing to indicate that local government will be different from the provincial or the federal government in this regard.

To make matters worse, there seems to be no way of keeping the creation of local government from becoming politicized. The PPP is a perfect example of this. Previously, they disbanded the local government system from the Musharraf era and reinstated the less democratic commissioner system. If the PPP truly believes in the urgent need for local governance, they wouldn't have gone through the trouble of first disbanding local government and then reviving it. Rather, they would have wasted no time and simply focused on reforming Musharraf's system. The fact that they have revived this issue so close to the end of their term is nothing short of pure political manoeuvring to score points with voters.

This move also calls into question the PPP's decision to support the division of Punjab into multiple provinces. If local government is good for Sindh, why isn't it so for Punjab? Or is it that the division of Punjab into additional provinces is suitable for the weakening of the PML-N and has nothing whatsoever to do with providing better local administration? If so, then the PPP is once again guilty of politicizing local government.

Local government will eventually have to develop in Pakistan. There is simply no other way to administer a land so diverse and fragmented. However, there are other problems that need to be tackled first.

The rule of law needs to be extended so that political party elites and the state bureaucrats that they appoint are held accountable for how they use state finances. Parties need to change to where their leaders stop viewing state finances as a way of granting political favours. The political culture needs to develop to where parties stop politicizing the issue of local governance.

Only then can we begin to think about implementing an effective local government system.

Judiciary vs Executive

The first thing that should strike the mind in the ongoing confrontation between the judiciary and the executive is that there is no obvious answer regarding who is right and who is wrong.

Both sides are seemingly correct in their own way. As far as the judiciary goes, they are protecting the constitution. Who can fault someone for that?

What of the executive? President Zardari and his gang of coalition allies. From the outset, they have consistently reiterated that the parliament is the country's supreme political institution over and above the judiciary and that members of parliament are the true representatives of public will. By consistently equating the executive with the parliament, Zardari and his supporters have tried to portray the judicial attack on the executive as an attack on democracy. By attacking democracy, they say, the judiciary is implicitly pushing for military rule. This is particularly dangerous in a country that has experienced long bouts of military rule. It is particularly dangerous in a country which is presently experiencing one of its longest periods of democratic rule. It is particularly dangerous in a country which is going through an economic and fiscal crisis that may worsen if the political system becomes any more unstable.

Except, one cannot equate the executive with democracy as the PPP is doing.

When discussing this confrontation, it is not enough to nonchalantly refer to the side confronting the judges as simply the "politicians". Or "democracy". There are many types of politicians within a democratic system and they all come together to make it a working system. There are many components in a democratic system and the executive is but one of these. The judiciary is not taking on democracy specifically; it is taking on the executive as represented by the ruling PPP government.

To say that the judiciary is taking on the entire institution of democracy is, at best, inaccurate and, at worst, defamation.

Why the need for this distinction between democracy and executive?

Because, it is possible for a country to experience democratic rule as Pakistan has been doing and simultaneously suffer at the hands of an inept ruling government. Democracy, as a system, is not to blame. But one of its components is blameworthy. What the PPP is doing is blurring the fine distinction between democracy and the executive. Zardari is hiding behind the cover of democracy to disguise his executive's shortcomings.

But is it possible that pressuring the ruling government can eventually disrupt the entire democratic process even if the judiciary doesn't want to? Just because the judiciary does not intend to destroy democracy doesn't mean that it won't. No one - the judiciary included - is capable of predicting the results of the judiciary's constant pressuring of the civilian government.

Given Pakistan's history of military rule, this is a real danger. However, the danger is overstated. Pakistani democracy has been around for too long and the concept of multi-party politics is too firmly entrenched in the Pakistani psyche. Even when Musharraf ruled, he was forced to do so through the PML-Q. As such, even if the civilian government was ousted, it would come roaring back. The net result of such a turn of events would be Pakistan going through military rule only to inevitably come back to democratic rule.

Far from disrupting democracy, the courts are performing two vital functions by attempting to hold the PPP accountable.

They are asserting their own autonomy and creating their own identity among the various political institutions. This is important because a functioning democracy requires a delicate balance of power between all institutions. Dysfunction occurs when one institution does not have its own identity and becomes subordinate to others. One example of this is when the judiciary loses its identity and becomes a puppet of the executive as has so often been the case in Pakistani history.

Further, the courts are setting a unique precedent for future democratic governments: that it is not enough to simply be elected into power. A government must deliver upon its public mandate. If it doesn't, then that regime will be held accountable. Not through military might, as in the past, but through the rule of law.

When looked at from this angle, the confrontation between institutions becomes clearer.

The executive is in the wrong. The judiciary, in the right.

The Division of Punjab

There has been a lot of recent talk regarding the impending division of Punjab. From the viewpoint of many analysts and politicians, it is simply a matter of time before Punjab is divided into, at least, 2 provinces.

Does division, whatever form it eventually takes, make sense?

There is one line of argument that focuses on how large countries like China and India are able to experience substantial economic growth side-by-side with a substantial number of provinces. This argument makes the false assumption that the provincialism is somehow driving the economic growth. The truth is that the economies of these countries may be growing despite the provincialism as opposed to growing because of the provincialism.

In the case of China, there is a national history of a strong central state that has always ensured unity despite the many provinces. There is also the presence of a clear ethnic Han majority. Both of these factors ensure a stable and united political climate which helps economic growth. In Pakistan, we do not have a history of a strong central state nor do we have a clear ethnic majority. Regarding provincialism in India, there are worrying signs that regional parties are beginning to make inroads into the votebanks of the national parties. This may result in a more unstable political climate, which may affect Indian economic growth. A similar increase in regional parties and political instability can occur if Pakistan begins creating new provinces. As such, the economic benefits of further provinces is not clear-cut.

Besides economic benefits, supporters of devolution argue that there are political benefits such as enhanced government administration. The basic argument revolves around how Lahore and its neighbouring regions make maximum use of provincial funds and leave barely anything for the other regions of Punjab. There is some merit to this argument. It is a proven fact that provincial capitals have a natural monopoly on provincial resources. Generally speaking, the further a locality is from the provincial capital the tougher it is for provincial resources to arrive there.

However, there are many factors that help make a government's administration more efficient. One of these is a sincere group of administrators and bureaucrats. Even if a massive amount of funds are present as a result of creating a new province, there is a possibility that the funds will be captured by political groups that are not intent on sharing the newfound resources with the rest of the province. Who is to say that such a group will not exist in future provinces? In fact, the creation of provinces and the sudden granting of large provincial funds may cement the power base of corrupt groups that already exist in the region.

Supporters of Punjab's division regularly argue that the creation of further provinces provides another political benefit because it is a legitimate assertion of the democratic rights of the residents of Punjab. On what basis do they make this claim?

Do they make it on the basis of the resolutions that were recently passed by the National Assembly and the Punjab Assembly supporting the creation of further provinces? Such resolutions may represent the will of elected politicians but they do not represent the will of the people of Punjab. It is one thing to elect someone as your representative and have that person represent you in day-to-day political matters. It is quite another to have that person make a momentous decision on your behalf regarding the political status of the territory you live in. That is exactly what the National Assembly and Punjab Assembly have done.

The division of an entire province requires a referendum across the province. Only then can one make the claim that the creation of further provinces represents the true democratic aspirations of the majority of Punjab.

In short, the economic and political benefits of new provinces is not clear-cut. The speed with which the resolutions have been passed on such a momentous issue illustrates that the motives behind the resolutions are more for political power than they are for any serious solution to government inefficiency or disenfranchisement of the people of Punjab.

Should Gilani Resign?

The question of whether or not Gilani should resign is a legal one but it can also be considered a moral one.

Leaving aside the whole issue of parliamentary procedure and the various legal mechanisms that are present to disqualify a Prime Minister, there is the simple argument that the Prime Minister is a convicted criminal. At a purely personal level, then, he is not fit to lead a country. He doesn't have the moral foundation to do so whatever the eventual legal outcome is.

Of course, politics is about more than one person. The Prime Minister is no ordinary person and his resignation has all kinds of ramifications. The biggest one, from a national standpoint, is the issue of stability. So, the question that needs to be asked is whether or not Pakistan will become unstable as a result of Gilani's resignation.

The short answer is no.

Instability in a regime is felt when a political actor with substantial weight is abruptly thrown out of the mix. It is felt when someone irreplaceable leaves the scene. Gilani does not fit that bill. The PPP has no end of replacements for someone to fit the mould of an established party stalwart who will do the PPP leadership's every bidding.

The other factor to consider is that the PPP's present term in office is nearing an end. The election season has already begun and all of the political players are positioning themselves in anticipation of the next term in office. As such, a resignation by Gilani who is already on the way out would do little to affect political stability from the point of view of the democratic political process.

What about political stability as viewed by the army? Once again, Gilani's departure will probably do little to affect this. From the army's standpoint, the PPP is the institution of power while Gilani is simply one among many PPP politicians. The army is more concerned with the public's appetite for democracy versus army rule and are not so much concerned with a single political personality like Gilani. A Gilani departure followed by nomination of a like-minded replacement will not be significant enough to change the public's view of democracy and that is what the army cares about most.

On his own end, Gilani has confronted all the talk of his resignation head-on. He has repeatedly pointed out that the public, through the support of his parliamentary allies, have given him reason not to resign. This is a fiendish rhetorical trick because it plays on the public's sympathy for a government that is ruled by the people. Gilani knows that he can count on his parliamentary allies to not call for his resignation because these allies - like any rational politician - would much rather bring about his disqualification through the legal constitutional mechanisms that are already in place as opposed to abruptly ending his appointment by a vote of no-confidence.

Taken together, these points highlight a political leader who has no personal moral legitimacy and whose resignation would not affect political stability from any angle. To top it off, he is forcing his parliamentary allies to support his morally bankrupt position.

He should resign.

Democracy's next chapter

The familiar refrain of a democracy under threat is once again making the rounds in Pakistan.

The source of these worries is the image of the ruling government having to defend itself in the face of pressure from the military and the judiciary.

Last month, Prime Minster Gilani cryptically referred to the military establishment as a "state within a state" that must bow down to the government. More recently, Gilani reminded the judiciary of his public mandate to rule and the supremacy of the parliament above all else when he addressed the National Assembly during the passing of a pro-democracy resolution.

The culmination of the face-off between these state institutions occurred when Gilani appeared in the Supreme Court to defend himself against charges of contempt for not initiating cases against President Zardari. If Gilani is found guilty, it may potentially force early elections. To the casual observer, this situation seems ripe for democratic instability.

However, the Prime Minister's Supreme Court appearance is actually a good thing for Pakistani democracy in the long-run.

Democracy has been described as government of the people, by the people, for the people. In its present form, Pakistani democracy is certainly of the people, and by the people. That is why Gilani can repeatedly refer to his public mandate to rule and continually trumpets the supremacy of a parliament that is full of his coalition allies. The elections that brought the PPP and its allies to power were not as free and fair as we would have liked. But they were elections, nonetheless. In that sense, the present government is a legitimate expression of popular will.

By only focusing on his party's popular support, however, and forgetting his responsibilities as Government CEO, Gilani conveniently forgets how democracy cannot simply be by the people and of the people but must also be for the people.

It is that sense of accountability for the people that Gilani's Supreme Court appearance should be taken to represent.

It is likely that not much will come out of all of this due to the presidential immunity granted to Zardari via Pakistan's Constitution, and the Vienna Convention. What is more significant is the symbolism behind the Supreme Court attempting to hold the government accountable for not acting upon the judiciary's recommendations.

A frequent complaint against such open questioning of the government is the need for stability. This argument says that Pakistani democracy is inherently fragile and undue stress must not be placed upon it. Such an argument is particularly powerful in a country that has experienced sustained periods of military rule and where the military is perceived to hold sway over the civilian government even during times of democratic rule.

The argument, however, does not hold because it underestimates the strength of Pakistan's democratic structures, which have endured even during military rule.

Consider the Musharraf era. From the outset, Musharraf was forced to govern through parliamentary allies. He sought to legitimize his rule by seeking a show of support from the parliament. He tried to lengthen his rule by granting amnesty to popularly elected politicians. When he was forced out, it was due to a populist movement.

Democracy in Pakistan has progressed too far for it to be brought down so easily. What is needed now is for democracy to move beyond a simple expression of popular will and towards a system where the ruling government - no matter what party it happens to be from - is held accountable, whether it is the Supreme Court that does the accounting or the voters at the next election.